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Abstract 
Gestures, hand movements that accompany speech, affect children’s learning, memory, and 
thinking (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, 2003). Yet, it is unknown how children distinguish gestures 
from other kinds of actions. In this study, 4-9-year-olds (n=339) and adults (n=50) described one 
of three scenes: (1) an actor moving objects, (2) an actor moving her hands in the presence of 
objects (but not touching them), or (3) an actor moving her hands in the absence of objects. 
Participants across all ages were equally able to identify actions-on-objects as goal-directed, but 
the ability to identify empty-handed movements as representational actions (i.e., as gestures) 
increased with age and was influenced by the presence of objects, especially in older children. 
 
Keywords: gesture; action-understanding; representational movement 
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Unpacking the Ontogeny of Gesture Understanding: 
How Movement becomes Meaningful across Development 
In our daily lives, we are surrounded by people and objects. We see people act on objects, 
and we make inferences about a person’s goals and intentions from those acts. For example, if 
we see a woman reach toward a ball, we infer that the ball is the goal of the woman’s action. 
Infants as young as 5 months make these same inferences when observing a person act on an 
object (Woodward, 1998)––if a woman reaches out to grab a ball, infants focus on the target of 
her reach (the object), rather than the spatiotemporal properties of the reach.  
But the spatiotemporal properties of a movement are relevant at times, particularly when 
the purpose of the movement is not to achieve an external goal (like obtaining a ball), but rather 
just to move. Some movements are produced for the sake of movement––and these movements 
have internal, or movement-based, goals (Novack, Wakefield, & Goldin-Meadow, 2016; 
Schachner & Carey, 2013). Just as we make inferences about actions on objects from the context 
in which the action occurred (e.g., we use movement of a hand towards an object, as well as cues 
like handshape and eye gaze, to interpret the movement as goal-directed), we also use context (or 
its lack) to make inferences about movements whose goal is simply to move. For example, if we 
see someone wiggling her fingers in the air and there is no obvious context that offers a reason 
for the movements, we are likely to focus on the movement itself and interpret it as a movement 
produced for its own sake, (e.g., “oh, she probably just wanted to wiggle her fingers’). 
Finally, in addition to object-directed actions (which have external goals) and 
movements-for-their-own-sake (which have internal goals), there are also movements that have 
representational goals––these movements are called gestures. Visually, gestures are similar to 
movements that we interpret as having internal, movement-based goals: they typically occur in 
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the air (i.e., off objects) and therefore cannot be used to achieve external goals. However, when 
we interpret an empty-handed movement as a gesture, we use the spatiotemporal properties of 
the movement, along with features of the context in which the movement is produced, to imbue 
the movement with meaning, that is, to see it as a representation of an idea (Novack et al., 2016). 
For example, if we see someone wiggling her fingers in the air while saying, “the bugs were 
creeping all around,” the context provided by speech makes it likely that we will interpret the 
movement as having a representational goal (e.g., representing the movements of the bugs), 
rather than a movement-based goal (e.g., ‘just wiggling her fingers for no reason’). 
Recognizing the difference between gesture and other forms of movement is important 
from a psychological perspective, as gesture has been shown to have unique impacts on 
cognitive processes (Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). Gesture’s effect on cognition has been 
documented in adults (Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011; Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). 
But the bulk of the literature has focused on children who are given instruction that includes 
gesture (see Goldin-Meadow, 2015 for review). For example, children are more likely to learn 
about the function of a novel toy (Novack, Goldin-Meadow, & Woodward, 2015), early 
language concepts (Wakefield & James, 2015), bilateral symmetry (Valenzeno, Alibali, & 
Klatzky, 2003), Piagetian conservation (Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2008), and mathematical 
equivalence (Goldin-Meadow, Cook, & Mitchell, 2009) if they are given instruction with gesture 
than instruction without gesture (i.e., instruction with speech alone). These positive learning 
outcomes appear to be unique to gesture. Other types of movements, such as meaningless 
movements (Brooks & Goldin-Meadow, 2015) or actions on objects (Novack, Congdon, 
Hemani-Lopez, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014; Wakefield, Hall, James, & Goldin-Meadow, under 
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review), do not show the same effects on cognition, encouraging researchers to explore what 
makes gesture a particularly good teaching tool (Goldin-Meadow, 2011). 
Here, we focus not on whether children can learn from gesture––this point has been well 
established. Rather, we ask how children interpret and categorize different forms of movement, 
particularly the movements that adults interpret as representational (i.e., gesture) (Novack et al., 
2016). This issue has received relatively little attention, and may play an important role in 
determining whether a child will learn from gestures used as teaching tools––learners who 
interpret a movement as a gesture may be more likely to be influenced by that movement during 
instruction than learners who do not interpret the movement as a gesture. 
To determine when children categorize movement as gesture, we take advantage of a 
paradigm, developed by Schachner and Carey (2013) and adapted by Novack et al. (2016), to 
probe how participants classify movements. In this paradigm, participants describe simple scenes 
in which an agent moves and perceptual/contextual cues are varied. The original studies 
demonstrated that when adults see an actor moving objects (moving colored balls into boxes), 
they uniformly interpret the movements in terms of external goals––they recognize that the 
purpose of the movements is to affect objects in the external world (Novack et al., 2016; 
Schachner & Carey, 2013). In contrast, when adults see the actor move her hands in the air, 
either with objects present or absent, they are less uniform in how they interpret these empty-
handed movements (Novack et al., 2016). They sometimes describe the empty-handed 
movements as having movement-based goals, (e.g., “she waved her hands back and forth in the 
air”) and sometimes describe them as having representational goals (e.g., “she was showing how 
to move objects”). In addition, the presence of objects, as well as the presence of speech (even 
unintelligible speech) and a hand shaped as though it had performed the movement, all influence 
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whether adults interpret the movement as having a movement-based goal or a representational 
goal. In general, the more contextual information adults have, the less likely they are to focus on 
the spatiotemporal properties of the movements, and the more likely they are to attribute 
meaning to the movements. The question we ask is whether children process object-directed 
movements and empty-handed movements differently from adults.  
Previous literature suggests that children should be able to understand actions on objects 
as goal-directed from an early age. Young infants possess a number of the cognitive skills 
needed to read intent off of another’s actions––for example, the ability to follow body direction 
and gaze (e.g., Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002; Woodward, 
2003), the ability to identify the animacy of an agent (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007; Johnson, 
Shimizu, & Ok, 2007), and the ability to perform intentional actions oneself (e.g., Sommerville, 
Woodward, & Needham, 2005) (See Woodward, Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson, & Buresh, 
2009, for more on this topic). And, indeed, infants as young as 5 months systematically interpret 
actions on objects as goal-directed (e.g., Trabasso, Stein, Rodkin, Munger, & Baughn, 1992; 
Woodward, 1998). At the neural level, infants display neural responses that are similar to the 
responses adults display when viewing object-directed actions (Rotem-Kohavi et al., 2014; Virji-
Babul, Rose, Moiseeva, & Makan, 2012), suggesting that there is continuity in the way humans 
process object-directed actions across the lifespan.  
In contrast, we expect a more protracted period for children to develop an understanding 
of empty-handed movements as representational. Although some gestures, such as points, are 
viewed as intentional and communicative before 2 years (Krehm, Onishi, & Vouloumanos, 2014; 
Woodward & Guajardo, 2002), being able to interpret the content of representational gestures 
appears to develop gradually between the ages of 2 and 5 years (Goodrich & Hudson Kam, 2009; 
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Novack et al., 2015; Sekine, Sowden, & Kita, 2015; Stanfield, Williamson, & Ozcaliskan, 2014). 
For example, it is not until 26 months that children recognize the transparency of iconic gestures, 
and find iconic representations easier to learn from than arbitrary representations (e.g., they find 
it easier to link a hammering motion with a hammer than to link an arbitrary motion with the 
hammer––before 26 months, the two representations for hammer are equally easy to learn (Namy, 
Campbell, & Tomasello, 2004). Neuroimaging data suggest that these developmental changes 
continue until at least age 11, particularly with respect to integrating gesture with contextual cues 
like speech (Demir-Lira et al., under review; Dick, Goldin-Meadow, Solodkin, & Small, 2012; 
Wakefield, James, & James, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest that children’s ability 
to distinguish gestures from actions on objects as well as from meaningless movements may not 
be as developed as adults’ ability to make these distinctions 
Following Novack et al. (2016), in the present study, we use participants’ explicit 
descriptions of movement to provide insight into how they have interpreted that movement. We 
expect that, like adults, children will interpret movement performed on objects as directed 
toward external goals. If we find no age related differences in children’s interpretation of 
movement performed on objects, we can be confident that our paradigm is appropriate for 
children of all ages. In contrast, we expect that age will influence children’s likelihood of 
interpreting an empty-handed movement as representational. We have two additional predictions.  
First, we expect the presence of objects to play a role in children’s ability to interpret empty-
handed movement as representational. We know that adults use object cues when interpreting 
empty-handed movement (Novack et al., 2016), that objects are a salient part of children’s early 
learning environment (e.g., Pereira, Smith, & Yu, 2014; Yoshida & Smith, 2008), and that 
children’s early gestures often refer to objects (Gullberg, de Bot, & Volterra, 2008). As a result, 
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children may exploit this type of concrete cue when searching for meaning in movement. Second, 
given previous work suggesting that children display protracted development in their ability to 
integrate gesture with one particular contextual cue (speech), we predict that this other important 
contextual cue (object presence) may have a greater effect in later childhood than in the early 
years.  
Method 
Participants 
Usable data were collected from 339 children between the ages of 4 and 9 years (142 
females, 197 males) at a large, science museum in Chicago, IL in the summer of 2015. Although 
we did not collect demographic information from individuals, our sample was representative of 
the general profile of museum visitors. According to museum reports based on short surveys 
with museum visitors, visitors to the museum represent a number of different racial and ethnic 
backgrounds (70% White, 10% Hispanic, 6% African American, 6% Asian, 5% Other, <1% 
Native American, Native Hawaiian), and are also diverse in socioeconomic status, based on self-
report measures of perceived socio-economic status (13% Lower or Lower-Middle Class, 54% 
Middle Class, 33% Upper Middle or Upper Class) and parent or guardian’s highest level of 
formal education (1% < high school diploma, 18% high school diploma, 16% associates degree, 
35% bachelors degree, 21% masters degree, 7% Ph.D. or other terminal professional degree, 3% 
not reporting). Parents provided informed consent, and children provided verbal assent. Children 
were recruited to be as evenly distributed across the age range as possible (4 yrs: n=70; 5 yrs: 
n=58; 6 yrs: n=50; 7 yrs: n=59; 8 yrs: n=56; 9 yrs: n=46); nevertheless, birthdates were collected 
and exact age in years (e.g., 7.76) was calculated (difference between birthdate and date of 
experiment) and used as a continuous variable in all analyses except when specified. Children 
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were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, with a target of ~20 children of each age 
group in both the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present and the Empty-handed 
Movement with Objects Absent conditions, and a target of ~10 children per age group in the 
Movement Performed on Objects condition. Pilot testing showed almost no variability in 
responses for the Movement Performed on Objects condition; as a result, we decreased the 
sample size for this condition. An additional 64 children were recruited for the study but 
excluded from analyses for refusing to respond to the initial prompt (n=51), providing a response 
to the initial prompt that was completely irrelevant (e.g., mentioning events from popular 
children’s movies; mentioning things happening nearby in the museum) (n=10), saying they 
could not remember or did not understand what the prompt was about (n=2), or providing a 
response that was inaudible during coding (n=1). The task took 2-3 minutes for children to 
complete, and they were given a small prize for participating.  
Data were also collected from 50 adults (M = 42.2 years, SD = 12.1 years; 26 females, 24 
males) on the same task in the museum. Adult participants were not the parents of child 
participants. Like children, adults were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, with 20 
adults in both the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present condition and the Empty-
handed Movement with Objects Absent condition, and 10 adults in the Movement Performed on 
Objects condition. Data were collected on adults to (1) serve as a comparison to the child 
responses, and (2) replicate the adult findings from Novack et al. (2016) in the identical testing 
environment as the children.  
Stimuli 
Figure 1 displays still frames from three movie stimuli. Movies showed the torso of a 
woman in front of a table. Her chest, arms, and hands were visible, but her face was not. In each 
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10-second video, the woman produced movements with her hands. In two conditions (Movement 
Performed on Objects; Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present), four balls (two orange 
and two blue), and two boxes (one orange and one blue), sat on the table in front of the woman. 
In the third condition (Empty-handed Movement with Objects Absent), no objects were present 
on the table. The movies were identical to those used by Novack and colleagues (2016).  
Movement Performed on Objects. A woman picks up each of the four balls on the table 
and places them one at a time in the color-matched boxes (see Figure 1a). First, she picks up the 
inner blue ball with her left hand, and places it in the blue box on her left; then she picks up the 
inner orange ball with her right hand and places it in the orange box on her right. These actions 
are repeated with the outer balls. 
Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present.  A woman produces the same 
movements in the Movement Performed on Objects condition but over the objects, maintaining 
the handshape necessary to grasp the balls (i.e., a palm down C-shape) and the trajectory of 
movement used in the Movement Performed on Objects condition, but not touching the balls (see 
Figure 1b). In contrast to the Movement Performed Objects condition, there is no change in the 
location of the balls during the movie. 
Empty-handed Movement with Objects Absent. A woman produces the same 
movements as in the other two conditions, but without any of the objects present (see Figure 1c). 
The woman maintains the same handshape and trajectory as in the first two conditions. 
Timing of movements across videos was carefully controlled by having the woman in the 
movies synchronize her movements to an audio track, which was removed from the final 
versions of the stimuli. For additional details, see Novack et al. (2016). 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
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Procedure 
Children and adults were invited to participate in the study while they were visiting a 
science museum. The study was conducted at a small table located in a relatively quiet part of the 
museum, and children sat next to the experimenter facing a wall to decrease distractions. At the 
beginning of the study, all participants were told they would watch a very short movie and then 
be asked what had happened in the movie. They were also told that the movie had no sound so 
they had to pay very close attention. Participants then watched one of three 10-second movies on 
a 9.7-inch display iPad, depending on the condition to which they had been randomly assigned. 
When the movie ended, the experimenter asked, “What happened in the movie?” followed by 
additional prompts that were designed to further probe participants’ interpretation of the movie. 
All participants received the additional prompts, which were as follows. For participants in the 
Movement Performed on Objects or Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present conditions, 
the experimenter asked, “So at the end of the movie, were the balls in the boxes or out of the 
boxes.” This question was asked to determine whether children could correctly remember the 
end-state of the movie that they watched. The correct answer in the Movement Performed on 
Objects condition was that the balls were inside the boxes; the correct answer in the Empty-
handed Movement with Objects Present condition was that the balls were out of the boxes on the 
table. For consistency, a similarly structured prompt was asked in the Empty-handed Movement 
with Objects Absent condition: “So at the end of the movie, were her hands on the table or off of 
the table?” After focusing on the end-state of the movie, the experimenter again probed 
participants’ interpretation of the scene by asking, “So tell me one more time, what happened in 
the scene?” And finally, after children responded, the experimenter asked, “Did she do it for a 
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reason?” For children who answered “yes”, the experimenter asked “What reason?” Participants’ 
responses were audio recorded for later coding. 
Coding and Reliability. Participants’ responses to the prompt, “What happened in the 
movie?” were classified into categories based on an adapted version of a coding scheme used by 
Novack and colleagues (2016). Although the prompt does not specifically probe the intentions of 
the woman in the stimuli, the pragmatics of the question, combined with the fact that the 
woman’s movements appeared to be produced voluntarily, should invite descriptions of goals 
and intentions (see Schachner & Carey, 2013 for discussion of assumptions about intentionality). 
The codes are described below: 
(1) External Goal: The movie is described in terms of actions completed on objects, 
with the description focusing on movement of objects, rather than movement of hands 
(e.g., “she took balls and put them in boxes”; “the blue balls goed in the blue container 
and the orange balls goed in the orange container”; balls were placed in boxes”). In rare 
cases, this category also included attempted actions on objects “it looked like he was 
trying to put the balls in the box”).  
(2) Movement-Based Goal: The movie is described in terms of low-level 
spatiotemporal movements without mentioning a higher-level goal––the description is 
focused on the movement of the hands themselves (e.g., “a guy had his hands going back 
and forth”; “she was like, moving her arms”; “someone moved their hand from a ball to 
the block and back to the ball”).  
(3) Representational Goal: The movie is described in terms of movements 
representing (but not actually carrying out) external goals (e.g., “the person was imitating 
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putting the balls in the boxes”; “he was pretending to put balls in the container”; “she 
looked like she was playing a piano in the air”).   
(4) Other: The movie is described (a) without mentioning movement at all (e.g., 
“there was a hand”, “It showed a rectangle that was orange and two orange balls two blue 
balls and a blue rectangle”), or (b) mentioning movement, but the response was too 
ambiguous to assign a goal-oriented code (e.g., “it did um some marbles and um I saw 
some box”; “he was doing one by one”). 
Two researchers independently assigned a single code to all responses, which had been 
transcribed from the original audio files. Coders were blind to the condition and age of each 
participant. Coders agreed on 731 of 778 trials (94.0%), κ = 0.92. Any disagreements were 
discussed between the coders and resolved.  
 A separate coding system was used for the final set of prompts, “Did she do it for a 
reason? What reason?” As we were particularly interested in children’s ability to interpret 
empty-handed movement as representational, we coded whether responses to these questions for 
children in the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present and Empty-handed Movement 
with Objects Absent conditions suggested that they interpreted the movement as representational. 
Responses were coded as Representational if participants described the woman as having a goal 
to represent information through her actions (e.g., “to show us what he was gonna do with the 
balls into the blue boxes”; “To show little kids how to match colors”). Responses were coded as 
Nonrepresentational if participants said they were not sure or thought the woman did not have a 
reason for her movements (e.g., “No, I have no idea why she did it”), or if their response 
suggested the woman had a movement-based goal (e.g., “To like practice for something she was 
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going to get tested for”) or was ambiguous in terms of whether the goal of described actions was 
to represent information (e.g., “She was doing one by one”). 
As in coding the main prompts, two researchers assigned a single code to all responses, 
and were blind to the condition of each participant. Coders agreed 307 of 317 trials (96.8%, κ = 
0.92). Any disagreements were discussed between the coders and resolved. 
Results 
 As detailed earlier, children and adult participants were asked to describe one of three 
movies depicting a woman moving her hands, and to answer additional prompts about the movie. 
Descriptions were coded as having an external goal, a movement-based goal, or a 
representational goal; if a description did not mention a goal, it was assigned the code of ‘Other’. 
We first calculate the proportion of participants who gave the 4 types of response to the initial 
prompt in the Movement Performed on Objects condition (note that each participant gave only 
one response). Second, we calculate the proportion of participants who gave the 4 types of 
responses to the initial prompt in the two empty-handed movement conditions, Empty-handed 
Movement with Objects Present and Empty-handed Movement with Objects Absent.  We also 
calculate whether participants gave a representational goal response in these two conditions at 
any time across the entire study, taking into account responses across all prompts; here, our 
dependent variable is a binomial response––either providing, or not providing, a representational 
goal response at any point during the study. To assess the effect of age on responses in this 
section, we use age as a continuous variable, although we collapse into age groups for the 
purpose of data visualization, and for post-hoc analyses. As a preview, we found almost no 
variability in participants’ responses in the Movement Performed on Objects condition, and much 
more variability when participants described the empty-handed movement movies in the Empty-
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handed Movement with Objects Present condition and the Empty-handed Movement with Objects 
Absent condition. 
Movement Performed on Objects 
An established body of literature shows that the ability to interpret actions on objects in 
relation to external goals develops in infancy (e.g., Woodward, 1998). Thus, it was not surprising 
that we saw essentially no variability in responses elicited to the Movement Performed on 
Objects movie, regardless of age. Almost all responses children gave to the Movement 
Performed on Objects condition were coded as external goal responses (97.2%). A binomial 
logistic regression predicting the likelihood of an external goal response by child age confirmed 
that there was no effect of age (β = 0.39, SE = 0.46, z = 0.84, p = 0.40). We analyzed the adults 
separately and found, in line with previous work (Novack et al., 2016; Schachner & Carey, 2013), 
that 100% of adults provided external goal responses. 
Empty-handed Movement  
In contrast to the uniform responses elicited by the Movement Performed on Objects 
movie, there was considerable variability in responses from both children and adults to the 
empty-handed movement conditions, although participants did display distinct patterns to the 
two conditions overall (see Figure 2). Adults were most likely to produce movement-based goal 
responses in the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Absent condition; 70% of adults gave 
this response, with 25% giving representational responses. Children, too, gave movement-based 
goal responses in this condition, although a little more often than adults; 83.7% of children gave 
this response, with 12.6% providing representational responses. The opposite pattern was found 
for adults in the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present condition; 60% of adults gave 
representational responses, with 20% providing movement-based responses, thus replicating 
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previous findings (Novack et al., 2016). More children provided representational responses in 
this condition than in the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Absent condition (22.0% vs. 
12.6%), but movement-based goals were still children’s dominant response in this condition; 
42.4% of children gave this response, with 20.5% describing external goals, and 15.2% giving 
responses coded as ‘Other’. 
Log-linear poisson models, which allow for comparison of non-independent response 
codes, confirmed that both children and adults showed distinct patterns of responses in the two 
empty-handed movement conditions. For children, we ran a log-linear poisson model on a 2 
(Condition) x 4 (Response Code) contingency table, which revealed that responses in the Empty-
handed Movement with Objects Present condition were significantly different from responses in 
the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Absent condition (χ2, 3 = 64.57, p < .001). The same 
was true for adults, using a 2 (Condition) x 3 (Response Code) contingency table (χ2, 2 = 10.78, 
p < .005). Please note, three response codes were used in the contingency table as no adult 
responses were coded in the ‘Other’ category. 
Finally, we compared representational goals given by children and adults across both 
empty-handed conditions and found significantly higher rates of representational-goal responses 
in adults (45.0%) than in children (17.2%), χ2, 1 = 12.12, p < .001. There thus appears to be a 
developmental change in the ability to ascribe representational goals to empty-handed 
movements. 
---- Insert Figure 2 about here ---- 
Exploring the Language of Responses 
Comparing representational goals in children vs. adults indicates that there is a 
developmental change in how empty-handed movement is interpreted: notably, children are less 
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likely to describe movement as representational than adults. However, as our dependent measure 
was based on participants’ verbal responses, it is possible that the difference we see in 
representational goals between children and adults can be traced to differences in language 
abilities between the groups. In other words, describing representational goals may be more 
difficult than describing external goals or movement-based goals; if so, adults’ better verbal 
skills may underlie the developmental difference in representational goal responses. We address 
this possibility by examining features of the language used for each type of response.  
Response Length. First, we considered the length of responses. We ask whether 
representational goal responses tended to be longer than other types of goal responses, and also 
whether response length differed with age. If more words are necessary to describe a 
representational goal than other types of goals, children may be limited by their language. We 
found that this was not the case. Overall, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) predicting Response 
Length (number of words) by Age binned into groups (e.g., 4-year olds, adults) and Response 
Code (External Goal, Representational Goal, Movement-based Goal) showed an overall effect of 
age (F(5, 363) = 6.91, p < .001), where older participants gave longer responses than younger 
participants (see Figure 3). However, there was no significant effect of Response Code (F(2, 
363) = 1.97, p = .14), suggesting that a lower rate of representational responses in younger age 
groups is not due to a limitation in language ability. We find further support for this idea using a 
qualitative approach: We see a range of response lengths for representational goal descriptions. 
Typical examples of short responses included: “She was pretending to put balls in the container” 
(4-year-old) and “Imaginarily moving objects” (Adult). Examples of longer responses included: 
“Well she, it looked like she was pretending to pick the balls to there but she wasn’t really 
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moving them.” (8-year-old) and  “In the video, the gentleman, or lady, whichever it was, was 
simulating picking up a ball with each hand and putting it in the crate on the sides” (Adult).  
---- Insert Figure 3 about here ---- 
Types of Constructions Used to Convey Representational Goals. As can be seen from 
the examples provided, certain constructions (e.g., pretend to put, simulate picking up) lend 
themselves to describing representational goals. We coded the types of constructions participants 
used to convey representational goals, and asked (1) what types of constructions adults used in 
their representational responses, and (2) whether these devices were also used by children. If so, 
we have evidence that the children’s linguistic skills do not prevent them from expressing 
representational goals. 
We identified seven types of constructions used by the 17 adults who provided 
representational goal responses. Three of the constructions were each used by 4 of 17 adults 
(23.5% each): (1) Using the verb pretend (e.g., pretend to put, pretending to take); (2) using a 
more sophisticated verb that signaled pretense (e.g., simulate picking up, mime putting); (3) 
using a construction that indicated the actor was attempting to communicate information or 
demonstrate something (e.g., trying to say; signaled to go). The fourth construction was used by 
3 of 17 adults (17.6%): (4) Using the word like (e.g., looked like moving). The fifth, sixth, and 
seventh types were each used by 1 of the 17 adults (5.9% each):  (5) Modifying the noun to make 
it clear that the action was not actually taking place (e.g., moving imaginary cups); (6) 
Describing an action on an object not present in the scene (e.g., playing the piano; the woman in 
the video was seen by some participants as pretending to play a keyboard instrument); (7) 
Indicating an action that would take place in the future (e.g., going to put). 
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Having established the types of constructions that adults use to convey representational 
goals, we then asked whether children were able to use these same devices. We found that our 
youngest children––4- and 5-year-olds (of which there were only six)––used three of the adults’ 
construction types: Type (1) 2 of the 6 children who produced representational responses used 
the verb pretend; Type (5) one child modified the noun so that it was clear that the action was 
not actually taking place  (e.g., pretend balls); Type (6) three children described an action on an 
object that was not present (e.g., playing the piano). The remaining four construction types that 
adults used were seen only in the older children. The 6- and 7-year olds used two types not found 
in the responses of the 4- and 5-year olds: Types (3), e.g., showing, and Type (7), e.g., going to 
put.  The 8- and 9-year olds added two more types to their repertoires: Type (2), e.g., fakely took, 
and Type (4), e.g., looked like stacking. 
Although there are many ways to express a representational goal, the point we stress here 
is that there are simple devices that even the 4- and 5-year-olds in our sample were able to use.  
The difference in rates of representational goal responses that we have found across development 
are thus not likely to be due to developmental changes in language skills, but rather to changes in 
the ability to think about movements as representational actions. 
Representational Responses by Age 
Given that age-related language differences are not a concern, we next explored the effect 
of age on representational goal responses within our child sample, focusing on age-related 
differences in representational goal responses between the ages of 4 and 9. We had two 
hypotheses: (1) The propensity to interpret empty-handed movement as representational would 
increase with age. (2) Given findings that children show protracted acquisition of the ability to 
integrate gesture and contextual cues (Demir-Lira et al., under review; Dick et al., 2012; 
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Wakefield et al., 2013), object presence (which is a contextual cue) may have a bigger effect on 
the likelihood of interpreting empty-handed movement as representational later (rather than 
earlier) in childhood. Based on these hypotheses, we built a binomial model to test whether 
children’s likelihood of providing a representational response was predicted by Age as a main 
effect term, and Age x Condition (Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present; Empty-
handed Movement with Objects Absent) as an interaction term. The model supported our 
hypotheses, revealing a positive effect of age (β = 0.40, SE = 0.11, z = 3.79, p < .001)––children 
became more likely to give a representational response with age––as well as an interaction 
between age and condition (β = 0.10, SE = 0.04, z = 2.18, p < .05). Likelihood ratio tests 
confirmed that this model (a main effect of Age, and an interaction between Age and Condition) 
was a better fit than a simpler model without the interaction term (χ2(1) = 4.89, p < .05). A more 
complex model with both main effects (Age and Condition) and the interaction term (Age x 
Condition), did not improve the fit (χ2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.88). 
The interaction between age and condition suggests that the older a child is, the more 
influence object presence has on her ability to see empty-handed movement as meaningful. To 
explore this interaction more fully, we separated children into age groups by year (e.g., 4-year-
olds, 5-year-olds, etc.), and asked whether the presence of objects was a predictor of 
representational goal response within each group. There were no groups in which object presence 
was a significant predictor, probably because, when partitioned in this way, the age groups were 
too small to detect an effect. However, exploratory post-hoc analyses do point to differences with 
age: condition (Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present; Empty-handed Movement with 
Objects Absent) predicted the likelihood of a representational response after age 6 (β = 0.82, SE 
= 0.38, z = 2.19, p < .05), but not before age 6 (β = 0.04, SE = 0.84, z = 0.052, p = 0.96). With 
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the current data set, we cannot make a strong claim about the exact age at which object presence 
becomes an important cue to interpreting movement as representational. Nevertheless, our data 
do allow us to state with some certainty that this process unfolds across childhood. 
Our findings are thus in line with our two predictions: (1) children’s ability to understand 
empty-handed movement as representational develops with age, and (2) a rich context (objects 
present) supports representational goal responses better than a less rich context (objects absent), 
particularly in older children. However, we were surprised at the overall low rates of 
representational goal responses across the children (17.2%). Even 9-year olds, the oldest children 
in our sample, gave representational goal responses at half the rate that the adults in our sample 
did (9-year-olds: 20.5%; Adults: 42.5%). These low rates may suggest that children between the 
ages of 4 and 9 rarely interpret empty-handed movement as representational. Alternatively, 
children may simply need more opportunity and encouragement to express their competence. We 
explored this possibility using data from the additional prompts.  
Recall that after children gave their initial response to the prompt, “What happened in the 
scene?” they were asked about the ending-state of the movie. They were then asked a second 
time, “What happened in the scene?” as well as, “Did she do it for a reason? What reason?” We 
calculated whether a child gave a representational goal response to any of these three prompts. A 
child was classified as having given a representational goal response if she provided a 
representational goal (as opposed to an external goal, movement-based goal, or ‘other’ response) 
to at least one of the first two prompts, and/or if she provided a representational response (as 
opposed to a nonrepresentational response) to the final prompt.  
Based on data from these three prompts, we found that 31.1% of our child sample 
provided at least one representational response, which almost doubles the proportion of children 
UNPACKING THE ONTOGENY OF GESTURE UNDERSTANDING 
  
22 
describing empty-handed movements as representational after the first prompt (17.2%). As in the 
model based on responses following the first prompt, we found a significant effect of age (β = 
0.46, SE = 0.09, z = 5.15, p < .001) and an interaction between condition and age (β = 0.11, SE = 
0.04, z = 2.75, p < .01) (see Figure 4). In addition, using the same exploratory post hoc analysis, 
we found that children below the age of 6 were not influenced by the presence of objects (β = 
0.05, SE = 0.55, z = 0.09, p = .93), whereas 6- to 9-year-olds were influenced by the presence of 
objects (β = 0.88, SE = 0.32, z = 2.71, p < .01). Again, this result is exploratory––the solid 
conclusion from our data is that, over childhood, the presence of objects becomes increasingly 
influential in how empty-handed movements are interpreted; at issue is the precise age at which 
children begin to display this effect. 
We performed the same analysis on adults and found that they too were significantly 
more likely to provide representational responses after further prompting, raising their overall 
rate of representational responses from 42.5% to 67.5%, (χ2, 1 = 5.05, p < .05). Prompting thus 
increased representational goal responses in all participants, which means that children gave 
representational responses to empty-handed movement significantly less often than adults 
(31.1% vs. 67.5%) even after continued prompting (χ2, 1 = 18.51, p < .001). 
---- Insert Figure 4 about here ---- 
Empty-handed Movement as Action  
 Both children and adults, at times, gave external goal responses to the initial prompt in 
the Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present condition. This response was unexpected, as 
Novack et al. (2016) found no external goal responses to empty-handed movement in adults who 
typed their responses online. The external goal responses that the participants in our study gave 
were structured as if the actress in the movies had actually completed an action (e.g., “She 
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moved balls into boxes”) despite the fact that no completed actions occurred (i.e., the woman 
never physically touched or moved the objects). These responses raise two possibilities: (1) 
participants actually encoded movement off objects as movement on objects, or (2) given the 
pragmatics of the task, participants may have described the stimuli in terms of the actor’s 
intended goal (e.g., to move or try to move balls into boxes) on the assumption that the 
experimenter would know that the goal was not actually completed. In other words, these 
participants may have described the meaning of the actor’s movement, rather than providing a 
factual account of the video.  
To test these possibilities in adults, we first considered whether adults correctly answered 
the second prompt, “So, at the end of the movie, were the balls in the boxes or out of the boxes.” 
Of the four adults who provided external goal responses, three correctly stated that, at the end of 
the movie, the balls were outside of the boxes. All three adults then changed their response to the 
third prompt, “Can you tell me again what happened in the movie?” from external goal responses 
to representational goal responses. For example, after providing an external goal response 
initially, one participant said, “The person was reaching for the balls and putting––pretending to 
put them in the box, is I guess what they were doing.” The one adult who incorrectly said that the 
balls were inside the boxes at the end of the movie persisted in giving an external goal the second 
time she was asked. For the most part, adults who described empty-handed movements in terms 
of external goals did not actually think the balls had been moved.  Rather, the pragmatics of the 
experimental context seemed to draw them to interpret the empty-handed movement within an 
external goal framework. 
Like adults, children’s external goal responses describing empty-handed movement 
seemed not to be driven by an incorrect encoding of the event, but rather by the pragmatics of the 
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experimental context.  Of the 27 children who provided an external goal response to the initial 
prompt, 24 (88.9%) correctly identified the balls as being outside of the boxes at the end of the 
movie, which was comparable to the number of children who gave the correct answer across the 
other response types (82 of 93, 88.2%). But, unlike adults, of those 24 children, 17 persisted in 
giving external goal responses on the third prompt. The remaining 7 children gave a variety of 
responses, with only 3 changing their response to a representational goal.  Although both adults 
and children were affected by the pragmatics of the situation, children were still more limited 
than adults in their ability to describe empty-handed movements in terms of representational 
goals. 
 Discussion  
We investigated whether the ability to interpret empty-handed movement as gesture––as 
movements that represent––changes across development. Specifically, we asked children (4- to 
9-year-olds) and adults to describe empty-handed movements performed in the presence or 
absence of objects, and explored whether age and context affected their ability to imbue these 
movements with meaning. We found an overall increase across childhood in the ability to 
interpret empty-handed movement as representational actions, and some suggestion that, before 
age 6, children are not affected by the presence of objects. The influence of objects as a cue for 
seeing meaning in movement strengthens across childhood.  
We also found that the ability to describe movement as gesture follows a protracted 
period of development, particularly compared to the ability to attribute external goals to 
movement performed on objects. Children as young as 4 consistently described an event in 
which an actor physically moved balls into boxes in terms of external goals, as did adults. 
However, when shown empty-handed movements, children’s descriptions were not completely 
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adult-like. For example, although both adults and children sometimes described empty-handed 
movement in terms of external goals, adults corrected their responses when prompted, changing 
them to representational goals, whereas children did not. Most importantly, even by age 9, the 
oldest age tested in our child sample, children were not yet describing empty-handed movements 
as having representational goals as often as the adults in our sample, and our analysis of 
children’s language suggests that these effects were not a by-product of developing language 
skills. Together, these results suggest that even though a few children are able to attribute a 
representational goal to empty-handed movement at age 4, overall, children’s ability to describe 
empty-handed movement as representational is underdeveloped at this age. Our results thus build 
on the previous literature, broadening our understanding of humans’ abilities to interpret 
different types of movement across the lifespan. 
The ability of children to use the presence of objects as a cue to interpret an empty-
handed movement as representational strengthened across development, and an exploratory 
analysis suggested that this contextual cue may not affect 4- and 5-year-old children’s 
interpretation of empty-handed movement. This finding has implications for the framework 
developed by Novack and colleagues (2016), who suggested that adults use contextual cues from 
a variety of sources to increase their likelihood of seeing empty-handed movement as meaningful. 
Novack et al. identified three potential contextual sources: (1) cues internal to the movement, 
such as handshape, (2) cues external to the movement, such as the presence of objects, and (3) 
communicative cues, such as speech accompanying the movement. Here we asked whether 
children could make use of cues external to the movement when interpreting empty-handed 
movement, and found that this is an ability that strengthens across childhood. Thus, although 
adults reliably use a basic process––attending to and integrating contextual cues––to differentiate 
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between meaningful and meaningless movement, children do not, at least with respect to one 
type of cue––cues that are external to the movement. Further work is needed to determine 
whether children use the other two types of cues identified by Novack et al. (2016)––cues 
internal to the movement, and communicative cues––and to understand how the general ability to 
integrate context into decisions about what counts as a gesture develops over childhood.  
The current study shows that even with limited context, children are inclined to see 
empty-handed movement as having representational goals. Yet it is, in some sense, surprising 
that we observed such low rates of representational goal responses, particularly in our youngest 
participants (even after giving them additional chances to rethink and revise their interpretations). 
After all, previous work has found that children as young as 2 and 3 years can infer meaning 
from iconic gestures (e.g., Goodrich & Hudson Kam, 2009; Marentette & Nicoladis, 2011; 
Novack et al., 2015). Why then did fewer than 25% of our 4- to 6-year-olds offer 
representational goal responses to describe empty-handed movements? 
One possibility is that our study provided few cues that the empty-handed movement in 
our video should be interpreted as representational, which would highlight and exaggerate the 
observed developmental changes. The hand movements in our study were brief and were 
presented with minimal contextual support (i.e., no speech, no face to provide eye gaze or 
emotional expression). Young children may require a richer context than adults to infer meaning 
from hand movements. For example, it may be particularly interesting to consider 
communicative cues, such as the presence of a face or directed gaze, as these cues might be 
important for interpreting gesture. In fact, eye tracking studies have found that when watching a 
gesturing speaker, adults predominately focus on the speaker’s face, but shift their attention to 
the speaker’s hands when the speaker looks to his own hands, suggesting that gaze can cue the 
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importance of gesture (Beattie, Webster, & Ross, 2010; Gullberg & Holmqvist, 2006; Gullberg 
& Kita, 2009). In the current study, we intentionally eliminated the influence of social cues by 
only showing the actor’s torso, but future work should consider how the presence of social cues, 
such as the face and gaze, may influence an observer’s interpretation of a movement. 
Additionally, the stimuli in the current study showed familiar objects and actions. Even when 
objects were not present, the hand shape and trajectory could provide clues that called to mind 
common actions on objects – we saw representational goal responses about moving invisible 
cups or playing a piano that suggest this is true. In future work, it may be interesting to ask how 
very novel actions on unknown objects would be interpreted. Finally, one might imagine a 
condition with more contextual support than our Empty-Handed Movement with Objects Absent 
condition, but less contextual support than our Empty-Handed Movement with Objects Present 
condition. Instead of eliminating both the objects on which an actor might act (e.g., balls) and the 
objects involved in completing an external goal (e.g., the boxes into which balls could be placed), 
the empty-handed movements could be performed in the presence of just the goal-related objects 
(e.g., the boxes). Based on the framework put forth by Novack and colleagues (2016), we would 
expect the number of representational responses to increase in this condition, compared to the 
current Objects Absent condition. Comparing the representational responses elicited in this 
condition and the current Empty-Handed Movement with Objects Present condition would help 
to elucidate how context affects movement interpretation – that is, it would allow us to determine 
whether each additional contextual cue incrementally boosts the number of representational 
responses found in the empty-handed movement condition. 
Although it would be interesting to consider other forms of context, the finding that 
children are not as good as adults at integrating the meaning of gesture with other contextual 
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information is supported by existing research. For example, Kelly and Church (1998) showed 
that, unlike adults whose recollection of a spoken message was influenced by information 
conveyed in both gesture and speech, children’s recollections did not reflect an integration of 
these two streams of information. Along the same lines, Demir-Lira et al. (under review) found 
that only half of the 8- to 10-year-old children they tested on a task requiring gesture-speech 
integration solved the task like adults and integrated information across the two modalities.  Thus, 
it may not be just the lack of context that caused low rates of representational responses in the 
children in our study. Rather, the sparseness of our context may have highlighted a 
developmental difference between children’s and adults’ ability to process empty-handed 
movement as meaningful. 
We suggest that the developmental change we find in the ability to interpret empty-
handed movement as representational may be driven by developmental changes in domain 
general representational processing capacities (e.g., the ability to understand analogies, 
representations, and abstractions more broadly). This skill is known to show a protracted period 
of development in early childhood (e.g., DeLoache, 1995; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 
2006) and could contribute to a child’s ability to interpret a movement as representational. For 
example, Richland and colleagues (2006) show that children’s ability to reason analogically 
increases between the ages of 3 and 10, as they gain the ability to process relational complexity 
and ignore featural distractions. This is close to the age range in the present study, where we see 
a similar, protracted increase. Being able to describe our videos in terms of representational goals 
may be a signal that a child has reached a developmental milestone, and is able to interpret not 
just empty-handed gestures, but other kinds of movements and objects as well, as representations. 
Note that some children at each age do offer representational goals for empty-handed movement.  
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Perhaps children who produce more gesture themselves are particularly likely to see empty-hand 
movements produced by others as representational.  Alternatively, children who have better 
representational processing capacities (e.g., are better at seeing analogies more broadly) may be 
likely to view gesture as representational actions. Testing this second possibility would require a 
separate measure of representational processing capacities to correlate with the ability to attribute 
representational meaning to empty-handed movement in our task. 
In addition to demonstrating a developmental shift in children’s ability to interpret 
empty-handed movement as representational, our study can inform research on the benefits of 
using gesture in instruction. Previous work has shown that children learn better from instruction 
that contains gesture than from instruction that does not contain gesture (see Novack & Goldin-
Meadow, 2015, for review). Often these gestures are produced in the presence of objects that are 
referenced through the gestures (e.g., a gesture near two numbers indicating that a student should 
add the two together, or pointing gestures highlighting analogous sides of rectangles in an 
algebra problem). Of course, not every child given instruction containing gesture benefits from 
that instruction.  We suggest that a child’s ability to learn from gesture in an instructional setting 
might be related to that child’s ability to describe gesture in terms of representational action. For 
example, children who describe the empty-handed movements in our study as representational 
might be more able to learn a ball-moving routine from gesture than children who do not 
attribute representational meaning to the empty-handed movements.  Alternatively, if learning 
from gesture is an implicit process, then children may not have to be aware that gestures are 
representational in order to learn from those gestures in a lesson. Indeed, some research has 
shown that, at least when children produce gestures, they do not need to be aware of the meaning 
of the movements in order to benefit from their content (Brooks & Goldin-Meadow, 2015). Even 
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if it turns out that recognizing a hand movement as meaningful gesture is not essential to being 
able to learn from that movement, it could make learning more likely.  If a child thinks that a 
hand movement is meaningless, the child may be less inclined to pay attention to it, which is 
likely to diminish its benefit. 
In conclusion, our work shows that, by age 4, children have the capacity to recognize 
some kinds of hand movements as gestures––movements that are produced to represent 
information rather than to effect actual change in the world (e.g., object-directed actions) or to 
merely move (i.e., movement for its own sake). We also found that, particularly after the age of 6, 
children are able to use contextual cues (in this case, the presence of objects relevant to the form 
of the moving hands) to increase the likelihood that they will interpret an empty-handed 
movement as representational. Taken together, our results suggest that, even to children, empty-
handed movements are not necessarily seen as meaningless hand movements through space, but 
rather as rich representational forms that have the capacity to carry meaning and convey 
information––that is, as gesture. Our study represents an important first step in determining how 
children identify empty-handed movements as meaningful, and raises intriguing questions about 
whether the ability to identify a movement as gesture is related to the efficacy of that gesture in 
communicative contexts, educational contexts, and cognitive processes more broadly. 
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Figure 1. Stills from movie stimuli in the three conditions: (a) Movement Performed on Objects, 
(b) Empty-handed Movement with Objects Present, (c) Empty-handed Movement with Objects 
Absent. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of adults and children who gave External goals, Representational goals, 
Movement-based goals, or ‘Other’ responses in the two Empty-handed Movement conditions. 
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Figure 3. Average length of response in each age group as a function of Response Code. 
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 Figure 4. Proportion of children in each age group giving at least one Representational goal 
response during the experimental session in each of the two Empty-handed Movement conditions.  
 
